This paper examines the incentive effect of a discontinuous and nonlinear compensation scheme, using the transaction data provided by two North American auto dealerships. Under the nonlinear scheme, a salesperson's expected daily commission revenue critically depends on his position in the pay schedule on the day. We find that a measure of varying incentive intensity has a positive effect on the distribution of daily sales, suggesting that salespeople adjust their effort levels in response to the intensity of the incentive. Furthermore, incentive intensity has a negative impact on the dealership's gross profit rate, suggesting that employees are gaming the system by lowering the prices they offer customers in order to achieve more sales and larger commissions. Our study shows that there is a cost associated with a discontinuous non-linear pay scheme, which is prevalent in the industry, and raises the question of why many firms use such a form of contract. 
Introduction
Why do we frequently observe discontinuous non-linear pay schemes in sales operation such as auto dealerships? Certainly as Holmstrom (1979) or MacLeod (2003) suggests, when the agent is risk averse, the optimal compensation contract could take the form of bonus contract where the pay jumps beyond a certain threshold. In such contracts, though, the agent normally receives bonus with sufficiently high probability while she fails to get it only when she is very unlucky or did not put forth a required level of effort. The firm does not need to pay so much risk premium as long as the probability of being very unlucky is reasonably low.
In reality, however, many firms do offer the kinds of incentive schemes that cannot be optimal in a simple contract theory. For example, we often observe pay schemes with multiple discontinuous points, or those expected to have many workers fail to receive bonus with substantially high probability. One possible explanation is that the discontinuity is the result of efforts to make the contract as simple as possible. For example, when there is an adverse selection problem in terms of salesperson's talent, the optimal pay scheme may be convex from the needs to compete for capable salespeople (e.g. McAfee and McMillan 1987) . As we will show later, when piece/commission rates increase at certain thresholds, pay-performance schedule may approximate the optimal convex contract. Such schemes are simple enough for any salesperson to understand but create discontinuities in the pay structure. Given the transaction costs caused by the time to explain or misunderstanding, simpler contracts might be desirable even if they involve some discontinuities.
On the other hand, convex or non-linear pay schemes could have a number of "side effects." First, such schemes are known to be prone to "gaming" by employees. Under the convex pay scheme, for example, concentrating outputs/sales in one evaluation period increases the overall pay thus creating the incentive to manipulate the timing of outputs/sales. In case of salespeople, they might postpone the sales (so-called "push-out") or advance the sales that would otherwise realize in the next period with extra incentives (so-called "pull-in") depending on their performance in the early stage of the evaluation period. Furthermore, when the pay schedule has discontinuous points, namely the thresholds that trigger a jump in piece rate or commission rate, the employees who are close to the thresholds may have an incentive to manipulate the performance in order to pass the threshold thus earning more. Second, discontinuities could be disruptive to the business -the employees who are close to the thresholds would spur while those who have passed them might slow down thus creating the difficulty in inducing uniform and stable exertion.
Despite the above issues that are all important for managers, pros and cons of discontinuous non-linear incentive schemes have not been fully examined in the literature. In this paper, we attempt to investigate the cons of such contracts -gaming and varied performance -and estimate the size of the distortion while we only speculate on their pros from our belief that it requires the approach beyond the boundary of economics (e.g. cognitive science). More specifically, we aim to answer the following questions: (1) how will the changing incentive intensity along a discontinuous non-linear pay schedule affect the daily productivity?; and (2) how will the position in the pay schedule induce the salespeople to manipulate prices to influence the timing of customer purchases?
Literature Review
There are many studies that estimate the impact of piece rate schemes in the agency theoretic framework using personnel records within a firm (Lazear 2000 , Paarsh and Shearer 1999 , 2000 , Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul 2005 , 2007 . They all find a productivity improvement after the introduction due to the incentive and sorting effects. But those studies mostly target the jobs where there is not much uncertainty about the link between efforts and outcomes such as windshield installers, tree planting, fruit picking, etc. Marketing researchers, on the other hand, look at the sales jobs where there is substantial uncertainty in the sales environment and examine the relationship between the environment and the types of pay schemes using the agency theory (Basu, Srinivasan, and Staelin 1985 , Coughlan and Narasimhan 1992 , Mishra, Coughlan, and Narasimhan 2003 .
Sales jobs may be good targets for researchers who are interested in whether we can find the negative correlation between the degree of uncertainty and the strength of incentives -a prediction of standard contract theory. High level of uncertainty typically observed in many markets, however, may cause a trouble when researchers attempt to examine the relationship between the compensation scheme and the performance because the same unobservable factors may affect both the decision to change the compensation system and the performance.
There have been some interesting studies on gaming in recent years. Oyer (1998) analyzes the incentive effect of nonlinear compensation contracts and finds in the industry-level data that manufacturing firms' sales are higher at the end of the fiscal year and lower at the beginning than they are in the middle and the price patterns are also consistent with the story that they manipulate prices to influence the timing of transactions. Asch (1990) examines a similar behavior among recruiters in the U.S. Navy at the individual level. The number of new recruits grows as the end of the evaluation periods nears, and then falls off sharply when the period ends. Larkin (2007) succeeds to obtain clear evidence of salespeople manipulating prices to influence the timing of customer purchases from the analysis of 2,938 transactions made by 175 sales staff between 1997 and 2002 at a large software vender. Larkin not only find a evidence of "timing gaming" but also estimates the firm's loss caused by the manipulated prices. According to his study, the firm ends up paying 8% more commission due to the timing gaming in addition to the loss caused by the price discount.
One weakness of the past work on gaming is that the time-variant intensity of incentive to manipulate prices is not directly evaluated. Therefore, it is not clear how much of the performance variation is affected by the varied efforts and manipulated prices or simply caused by some random disturbances. We attempt to contribute to the literature by directly estimating the bias created by the gaming behavior.
Compensation System and Practices at Auto Dealerships A and B
Auto dealerships A and B are located next to each other at an auto mall in a city of Canada. Both firms are owned by Mr. X who acquired them in July 2004. The dealerships have such functional sections such as administration, service, parts, inspection and sales. In North America, compensation for salespeople is 100% commission at most auto dealerships. In addition, commission rates typically increase as they sell more cars thus creating convex nonlinear pay schedule. But the details of the commission policy vary across dealerships. where pack is explained to the employees as the typical inventory cost and is subtracted from the gross profit in computing commission for low performers. At dealerships A and B, pack is the 2% of cost price but capped at the maximum of C$400. As is summarized in Table 1, for salespeople who are in charge of new cars, the commission rate is (1) 25% with pack if the total monthly sale is between one and eleven units; (2) 25% without pack if the total monthly sale is between twelve and thirteen units; (3) 30% without pack if the total monthly sale is between fourteen and fifteen units; (4) 35% without pack if the total monthly sale is at least sixteen units.
For those in charge of used cars, the thresholds are lower: (1) 25% with pack if the total monthly 1 Profit adjustments for trade-ins are made before commissions are calculated.
sale is between one and five units; (2) 25% without pack if the total monthly sale is between six and seven units; (3) 30% without pack if the total monthly sale is between eight and eleven units; (4) 35% without pack if the total monthly sale is at least twelve units.
There are several notable elements in their commission practices. First, in the calculation of commission rate, the number of cars sold in excess of the highest incentive threshold (i.e. 16 units for new car and 12 units for used car) is added to the car sales counts in the following month. For example, suppose you sell 20 cars in January and 12 cars in February.
Your commission rate for January is 35% without pack because you sold more than 16 cars, and your commission for the 20 cars realize at the end of January. Then, the 4 units that exceeded the threshold for the highest commission rate will be added to the counts for the next month. In February, your commission rate is 35% without pack again, because you have 16 units (12 units you sold in February plus 4 units you carried over from January). But, in February, you receive ONLY the commission for the 12 units of cars you sold and not for the 4 units carried over. In other words, the carryover is used only in computing the commission rate but not for the commission itself! 2 Note that the provision of this carryover practice effectively rules out the possibility of "push-out" for high performers. Since high performers already enjoy the same benefit as if they postpone the customer purchases without risking losing them, they have no 2 Another caveat is that you can carry over only for one month. Suppose you carry over 18 units from the previous month and sell 12 units this month. You might think that you can carry over 18 + 12 -16 = 14 units. But, since you cannot carry over any part of the 18units from the previous month to the next month, the maximum you can carry over is 12 units, the number of units you sell this month.
incentives to do so. It does not, however, rule out the possibility of "push-out" for low performers -namely, the salespeople who could sell only a few cars thus expecting to face the lowest commission rate this month may try to postpone the sales opportunities to the next month hoping to enjoy a higher commission rate then. But, we believe that it is very unlikely because not completing the deal today (say, by telling the customer it takes a few days to order a car she wants) will increase the risk of losing the customer.
Second, only sales managers have the authority to adjust prices. However, salespeople may influence that decision by demonstrating sales effort and negotiating discounts with customers. This means that negotiating with the sales manager on behalf of their customers could become part of their efforts to increase their sales performance.
Thirdly, there are a variety of opportunities to receive a fixed bonus or fixed pre-determined compensation instead of the commission that solely depends on the gross profit and the car units sold in the month. For example, special bonuses called "spiff" are paid for the first deal concluded on Saturday. Bonuses are further paid when cars are sold from "dead stock"
(i.e., inventory for more than 100 days).
Fourth, there are cases when two or three salespeople were involved in the same transaction (2 salespeople: 1011 cases, 3 salespeople: 21 cases). Depending on the role played by each salesperson, how the commission will be split or how they will be counted in computing the basis for commission rates differ. If the two salespeople contribute equally to the sale, both the commission and the count may be split. 3 If one salesperson is lead and the other an assistant, the first may be paid the full commission while a fixed payment (for example, $50) is transferred from the first to the second.
Salesperson's Problem
If a salesperson is fully rational, he will choose the level of effort strategically thinking as to how selling one more car will affect the expected commission income for the month or even that for the next month through an expected increase in carryover. is the cost of effort with c''(e) > 0.
Let u it (s,  , | i t X ) be the value function evaluated at date t when the accumulated car units sold is s and the carryover from the previous month is . G(s, ) is the monthly commission for the total car units sold s and the carryover . The salesperson's problem is to maximize the value function by choosing the right level of effort and, using the dynamic programming framework, the Bellman equation can be expressed as:
where  is the monthly discount rate that applies only across months, 3 s in the second equation is the threshold that triggers the increase in commission rate from 30% to 35% (i.e. 3 s =16 for salespeople in charge of new cars), and
. Note that we assume that there is no discounting for the cost of efforts exerted at different dates within the month. The first term of Equations (1) is not concave in general. Hence, note that some additional conditions need to be imposed on the distribution of y to ensure the uniqueness of the solution to (1).
The first-order conditions are thus expressed as follows:
From these equations, it is possible to argue that the optimal effort level depends on the day of month, accumulated car units sold, salesperson characteristics, market condition, etc., thus can be expressed as
e t s X  . As can be easily predicted by Equations (2), the sequences of effort levels taken and accumulated car sales interact dynamically. Since estimating the structural equations in (1) and (2) using the method of simulated moments is quite challenging, we first attempt to estimate the following reduced form assuming myopic agents.
Suppose salespeople are only interested in maximizing daily realized increment to their monthly commission rather than being a fully rational agent taking into account the future impact of their current efforts. Such myopic behavior may be part of human nature as has been shown in the literature of addiction and loss aversion in investment. Under this myopic agent assumption, we define the salesperson's problem as follows: . Therefore, the model was formulated so as to accommodate such a data restriction. This implies that the estimates we present later are the averaged relationships.
Second, we assume that the expected price or gross profit is constant and is not affected by the level of effort. Heightened effort is assumed to enhance ingenuity in persuading customers and negotiating with sales managers on sales terms, or improve service. As will be discussed later, however, the assumption is unrealistic because the salespeople are expected to negotiate harder for lowering price when marginal commission is large. Nevertheless, such influence over the price has a limited impact on marginal commission when compared with their observed jumps caused by discontinuous pay schedule. We believe that the above simplification is unlikely to invalidate our findings on the relationship between the varied incentive intensity and the performance of salespeople.
Like in the case of fully rational agents, we can claim from Equation (4) however, that we may unrealistically assume that salespeople do not recognize the impact of their efforts on their future commission through carryover. Some modification may be necessary to take into account the carryover effect in estimating the distribution of car sales.
The Data
We Therefore, our daily data basically have records from Monday through Friday excluding public holidays with the exception of the last day of the month. When the last day of the month falls in weekends, many of the transactions made in the weekend seem to appear as being made on either Saturday or Sunday in order to count them for calculating the monthly commission payout. Such accounting practice makes it necessary to include all the last days of month in our daily data even when they are in weekends. Furthermore, processing transactions are sometimes simply postponed when the sale is made after accountants left office or they could not handle all deals in single day.
Our key concept to measure the intensity of incentive is marginal commission which is the increment to the monthly commission realized by selling one more car. For example, suppose there is a salesperson who has sold 13 new cars and already earned $4000 as commission. By selling one more car, the commission rate that applies increases from 25% to 30%. Suppose the gross profit that the salesperson brings additionally by selling this car is $1300.
Selling this car not only give the salesperson $390 (=$1300×30%) commission but also raises the commission that he has already earned from his previous sales by $800 (=$4000×
(30%-25%)). Therefore, the marginal commission in this case is $1190. Figure 2 shows how marginal commission changes as the salesperson sells more cars under the assumption that the sales price and the gross profit rate are constant at $25,000 and 5%, respectively. As can be seen in the figure, marginal commission jumps at three thresholds where the commission rate changes.
Empirical Strategy
Based on the setup formulated in Section 4, we evaluate how the incentive intensity embodied in the distribution of daily sum of marginal commission affects the actual car units sold by the salesperson. The dependent variable here is daily car units sold, which is discrete count data, and we assume zero-inflated Poisson distribution for it. 5 Zero-inflated Poisson regression is more appropriate than simple Poisson regression because we constructed the daily performance data from the transaction data, thus we cannot distinguish the days when a salesperson was not at work and the days when he was present but failed to sell any cars. We need to account for the extra zeros caused by the lack of work attendance record.
Although it is necessary to use zero-inflated Poisson regression from the lack of work attendance information, salespeople themselves should be making decisions based on the right distribution conditional on full information they have. 
This means that the variable y it takes the value zero with probability it  and follows Poisson distribution with probability (1-it  ). The distribution parameters  it and  it is determined as follows:
Z , is the vector of variables that affect the probability of it  being zero such as day of week and month and j i X , is the vector of variables that affect the sales performance of individual salespersons. From the setup, The left-hand side of (5) is the marginal profit and measures the additional daily commission earned when the increase in effort shifts the mean of the car sale distribution to the left. This has to be equal to the marginal cost. Since estimating the cost of effort is difficult in our approach, we will first approximate the left-hand and use it as a proxy for the level of effort in estimating the car sales distribution. The way we approximate the left-hand side of (5) . Then, estimating the parameters of car sales distribution is simplified to identifying the parameters of the probability mass function f below.
f X e y e e y X f y X e y y y To summarize, we take the following two steps:
First
Step: We run zero-inflated Poisson regression to identify the parameters of (6) (6) is the expected marginal commission from a future sale and depends on the expected price or gross profit for the sale. We compute the sequence of the expected marginal commission based on the average gross profit in our data base, which is C$1081 for a new car and C$1662 for a used car.
Second
Step: We run zero-inflated Poisson regression to identify the parameters of the 
where it TS is a dummy variable taking one when the commission rate reaches 35%, the maximum rate achieved after surpassing the highest threshold -16 units for new-car salespeople and 12 units for used-car ones.
it TS is added to the vector of independent variables because INCTV drops after passing the last threshold but salespeople is expected to maintain motivation because increasing the carryover to the next month will raise the expected monthly commission received next month. We need to account for this offsetting effect.
In order to check the robustness of the results, we also estimate a zero-inflated negative binomial distribution to account for the possibility that the variance is greater than Poisson due to unobserved ability differences among salespeople and changes in competitive environment.
The next question we examine is whether the sales efforts appear as the form of lower prices. It has been argued that a strong incentive for salespeople is double-edged sword because price is an effective instrument for them to influence the timing of customer purchases (Larkin 2007 ). The firm's profitability may be harmed by both lower prices and higher commission payout. We investigate this possibility by analyzing the relationship between the marginal commission from a transaction and its price using the transaction data. Specifically, we take either gross profit rate or logarithm of gross profit rate plus 10% as dependent variable and run OLS.
where ij X is a regressor containing attributes of transaction j and characteristics of salesperson i who made it including day of week and month, car model, regional car sales, dummy of collaborative sales, and age and tenure of the salesperson, j B is a vector of bonus-related variables such as dummy of bonus and size of bonus, _ j m comm is the marginal commission brought by transaction j, and ij  is the error term.
We prefer log of gross profit (10% is added because gross profit is negative for some transactions) from the two reasons. First, the relationship is unlikely to be linear. Negotiating with the sales manager to lower price by 1% is much easier when the gross profit is 15% (which is typical for used cars) instead of 4% (which is typical for new cars). Second, as is shown in Figure 3 , the distribution of gross profit is skewed to the left with very long tail on the right.
Taking logarithm helps us to avoid outliers from causing bias on the estimates.
Main Results

Is the discontinuous non-linear incentive scheme inducing the salespeople to vary their effort level?
Figure 4 depicts the histogram of average daily car sales by day of month. The graph shows that the 23% of deals concentrate on the last days of months, followed by slow first weeks of the following months. We suspect that both supply and demand side factors might have contributed to this phenomenon. On the supply side, the current structure of commission schedule might be inducing salespeople to intensify their sales effort toward the end of the month hoping to raise their commission rate as the thresholds approach. One other factor on the supply side is the bias created by the accounting time lag. As is explained earlier, there could be one or two day time lag between the day when a car is sold and the day when the sale is recorded in the system. Since there is no time lag for the last day of the month, sales record for the last day should be upward biased. This measurement error, however, should account for only a small portion of the concentration. On the demand side, consumers who know the supply-side situation might wait on the side line until the end of the month expecting to see salespeople desperately offer attractive prices to make immediate sale.
Although the supply-side factors may play a dominant role in creating such a sales pattern, the demand-side factor may not be negligible. Figure 5 compares the same graph as Figure 4 separately between the days when the marginal commission total exceeds the actual commission total and the days when the converse is true. Roughly speaking, the sales in the left-hand side graph are made when the threshold is reached on the same day thus the monetary incentive should have been strong (call it "high incentive phase") while those in the right-hand side one are made when the commission rate is not changed on the day, therefore, the monetary incentive must have been relatively weak (call it "low incentive phase"). Note that sales jump substantially on the last days of months not only in the high incentive phase but also when there is no increase in the commission rate. The fact that the sales tend to concentrate on the last day regardless of incentive intensity seems to indicate that the demand-side factors have a substantial influence over the sales pattern we observe.
In order to further investigate how important are the supply-side factors, we compare the sales patterns between new employees (tenure of two years or less) and old ones (tenure of more than two years). Our assumption is that employees with long tenure should have more connection in the local market, more negotiation power with sales managers, and more knowhow to complete sales, thus are more likely to concentrate sales on the last day. Figure 6 , however, indicates that there is little difference in the pattern (i.e. 25-30% of sales are made on the last day of month) between new and old employees.
Given the downturn in sales in the first weeks of months, one might suspect that there might be manipulation of transaction dates (i.e., moving some sales records in the first week to the last day of the previous month). Figure 5 implies that it is unlikely. If the concentration of sales on the last day is a result of manipulated timing, it should be associated with an increase in the commission rate on the day. Figure 5 , however, shows that the concentration of sales is often seen without an increase in the commission rate implying that manipulation of timing perhaps has a very limited impact on the overall sales pattern if any. The possibility of such manipulation is also strongly denied by the management of the dealerships.
The surge in car sales on the last days of months also raises the question of whether it is primarily caused by price discount or not. Figure 7 illustrates the average car price by purchase timing (i.e. the number of days left before the month-end). The solid line indicates the simple average calculated for each day of month while the dotted line exhibits the average after adjusting for car model and age. The latter price measure is obtained by running OLS regression of car price using car model dummies and log of car age as independent variables and taking the sum of the residual plus the sample mean. The figure offers no indication that the price discount is driving the sales on the last day.
Following the empirical strategy developed in Section 6, we estimate the daily car units sold by individual salespeople using zero-inflated Poisson regression and zero-inflated negative binomial regression. The results are presented in Table 2 . Columns 1 and 2 show the results for all salespeople while Columns 3 and 4 show the results for those who are in charge of new car sale. The reason why we restrict some regressions to new-car salespeople is that the relationship between the incentive intensity and the performance could be quite different between new cars and used cars because the mean and variance of gross profits are significantly different between the two groups.
The primary focus of our analysis is the effect of incentive intensity, which is shown to have significant positive coefficients after controlling for timing-of-sales variables, individual characteristics, and provincial car sales. This implies that the effort level of the salesperson varies with his position on the pay schedule. The size of the coefficient is also about the same whether we include all or restricted to new-car salespeople. Dummy for surpassing the highest threshold also has a significant positive coefficient implying that the carryover opportunities provide some incentive effect.
One problem with those regressions is that the results are likely to be affected by self-selection. Namely, salesperson ability should be highly correlated with incentive intensity and the highest threshold dummy because able salespeople will reach or surpass the three thresholds and enjoy higher marginal commissions more frequently than less able salespeople.
The significant coefficients found above might merely reflect the correlation between the ability and the productivity In order to eliminate such effects caused by self-selection, we estimate the same pair of regressions including salesperson fixed effect. The results shown in Column 5 and 6 indicate that the coefficients for the incentive intensity become insignificant once the fixed effect is included.
But, the insignificance at the 10% level does not necessarily mean that the positive incentive effect fully disappears after controlling for self-selection. The p-value associated with the incentive variable in the zero-inflated negative binomial regression is 14% indicating the possibility that salespeople might be responding to the varying incentive intensity. 6 In other words, although the effect of incentive intensity is 85% lower with the salesperson fixed effect than without it, the possibility still remains that the salespeople are varying their effort level in response to the variable incentive intensity.
Is the discontinuous non-linear incentive scheme inducing the salespeople to manipulate prices?
The most frequently observed gaming among salespeople is to influence the timing of customer purchases to one's own interest. There are two directions for such manipulationpostponing (push out) or advancing (pull in) purchases. Between the two, we are not much concerned about the former for dealerships A and B because of the carryover practice. For those who have surpassed the highest threshold, there is little incentive to push out the transaction because additional cars beyond the threshold will be included in the car counts in calculating the 6 We tested the hypothesis that the distribution is Poisson instead of negative binomial setting the null hypothesis  = 0 where  is the gamma function parameter whose high value is consistent with negative binomial. The null was rejected at the 1% significance level. This is why we rely more on negative binomial regression in evaluating the results.
commission rate for the next month any way. For those who have been unsuccessful and cannot reach the first threshold in a particular month, there might be some incentive to postpone the sales opportunity to the next month because of the chance to surpass the thresholds and enjoy higher commission rates in the future month. But, even in such an occasion, any attempt to manipulate the timing (e.g. tell the customer that it takes time to get the car model delivered) will make the salesperson take the risk of losing the customer because both dealerships are in a so-called auto mall where competition among the dealerships are intense. Therefore, we will focus on attempts to "pull in" purchases.
Since solicitation calls or visits are not believed to be welcome nor very effective in car business in general, salespeople can only wait for customers at dealerships. Once they meet customers, the only ways to influence a customer's purchase decision are persuasion and an attractive price. Hence, we will focus on the question of whether a change in incentive intensity would affect the price as a result of the effort made by a salesperson.
First, let's take a look at the x-y plots of marginal commission and log of gross profit illustrated in Figure 8 to see the simple correlation between the two. In order to account for the differences in car prices, we subtract the actual commission associated with the sale from the marginal commission. Although there is a variation in gross profit rates partly because we have not controlled for car model, it is clear that the relationship is negative -salespeople facing higher marginal commission tend to offer lower prices thus leading to lower gross profit rates. In order to rigorously examine this observation, we study what determines the gross profit rate. although an increase in incentive intensity may improve the sales productivity, it may also reduce profitability through discount. Furthermore, various ad hoc bonuses are also negatively associated with the profitability. In this case, however, the causality is likely to be opposite because those cars that have been in inventory for long time are more likely to be targeted for additional incentives. The above results are robust to the inclusion of salesperson fixed effect (Column 2 and 5) and the restriction to new cars (Columns 3 and 6).
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Another finding worth noting is our confirmation of well-known fact that the gross profit rate is higher for used cars (Graduate School of Business, Stanford University 2000). Our study further shows that the older is a car the higher is its profit rate.
In earlier estimation of the effect on car sales, the inclusion of salesperson fixed effect substantially reduced the coefficient of incentive intensity. In contrast, in this estimation of the effect on profit rates, the result is robust to its inclusion. Here is the interpretation. Behind the former result is a strong correlation among unobserved salesperson capability, incentive intensity, and productivity. Since the salesperson fixed effect allows us to control for unobserved capability, it leads to the reduced association between incentive intensity and productivity.
In the latter, however, it is not clear how salesperson capability affects the gross profit. Salespersons with higher capability may be able to sell at higher price (positive correlation between capability and profit rate) or they may be able to negotiate with sales managers effectively thus sell at lower prices (negative correlation between capability and profit rate). Based on the result in this section, I suspect that salesperson capability has no significant correlation with profit rate.
Conclusion
The paper has investigated the incentive effect and the possibility of gaming caused by a discontinuous non-linear compensation system. This section summarizes the results and their implications.
First, we find that the number of car units sold by a salesperson is positively associated with the measure of individual incentive intensity. The relationship, however, seems to be largely caused by the strong correlation between unobserved salesperson capability and their incentive intensity measure. Once the salesperson fixed effect is included in the estimation, the coefficient drops by more than 80%. Nonetheless, the impact of incentive intensity still remains, even if the significance level is marginal, implying the possibility that salespeople change their effort levels in response to the varying intensity of incentives cause by the discontinuous jumps in the pay schedule. After all, the fact that almost one fourth of total monthly sale concentrates on the last day of the month seems to suggest that salespeople spurt toward the end of the month.
Second, we find some evidence that salespeople are influencing the price to induce customers to make immediate purchases -one form of gaming -by analyzing the relationship between the marginal commission and gross profit rate. When salespeople find additional sales extremely profitable for them due to the increase in commission rate, they not only work harder to persuade their customers but also intensify their effort to get better prices approved by their sales managers on behalf of their customers.
The above findings imply that the profits of the two dealerships might be negatively affected in two ways by such contracts. Inconsistent effort levels of salespeople may lead to missed sales opportunities for the firms. Second, by letting the salespeople gaming the system, the dealerships are selling cars at lower prices and at the same time paying more commission to the salespeople. If so, it is puzzling why so many firms are offering similar commission schemes. Simplicity might be one reason as we have discussed in the introduction. But it is unlikely to be the primary reason, because we can remove the discontinuities relatively easily without making the system more complicated.
One possible effect that is missed in the analysis is people's preference for discontinuities. People might like and get excited by achieving targets. Therefore, setting the explicit target may better motivate the employees and raise the average effort level beyond what an equivalent continuous compensation scheme can induce. This explanation, if it is found to be true, might be consistent with the phenomenon studied in Camerer et al. (1997) -taxi cab drivers are not rationally allocating time between work and leisure according to wage rate but instead choose the labor supply based on the daily income target. Further research in behavioral economics and social psychology will be necessary to deepen our understanding of the firm's choice of compensation system. 
